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A Guide to Understanding Discovery Sanctions
Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) and
Fashioning an Appropriate Judicial Response to
Serious Discovery Misconduct
Judge Sheldon Gardner*
Scott William Gertz**
I. INTRODUCTION
Discovery sanctions have become an important fact of life in the
world of modern litigation. Whether viewed as a necessary evil to
combat discovery abuses or a useful tool to keep litigation costs down,'
one consideration has become readily apparent with respect to discovery
sanctions: confusion abounds.2 Too often, attorneys seeking to invoke
discovery sanctions do not properly plead the applicable Illinois
Supreme Court Rules. In many cases, such confusion has a minimal
effect on the course of the litigation. Frequently, courts elect not to
entertain sanction motions, the party complies after the court threatens
to impose discovery sanctions, or the discovery sanction imposed does
not cause the dilatory party great financial or tactical hardship.
* Judge Gardner received his undergraduate degree from the University of Chicago in 1946
and his J.D. from the Chicago-Kent College of Law in 1953. He is currently assigned to the
Individual Commercial Calendar Section of the Law Division of the Circuit Court of Cook
County.
** Scott Gertz received his undergraduate degree from Syracuse University in 1990, a
master's degree from American University in 1994, and his J.D. from Chicago-Kent College of
Law in 1998. Mr. Gertz is an associate at Jacobs, Burns, Orlove, Stanton & Hernandez,
practicing labor law and employee benefits law. Prior to working in private practice, Mr. Gertz
served as Judge Gardner's law clerk and as a Cook County assistant state's attorney. The authors
appreciate the outstanding work of several of Judge Gardner's legal interns, including Lee Lane,
James Kienzle, and Kliment Mitreski.
I. Hon. George W. Timberlake & Nancy Pionk, Attorney Sanctions in Illinois Under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 137, 20 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1027, 1047-48 (1989) (discussing the tension
between the trial court's reluctance to impose sanctions and the desire of the trial bar and clients
to seek sanctions in order to keep litigation expenses down).
2. For example, in Room 2306 of the Daley Center in Chicago, it is not uncommon for
litigants to simply request "sanctions" against opposing counsel, without complying with Rule
201(k), without filing a sanction petition, or without specifying under which rule the motion is
brought.
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Occasionally, however, serious discovery misconduct is alleged, such
as repeated violations of court orders or the destruction of evidence.
When this type of allegation is made, there is little room for confusion
on the part of the bar or the bench. Indeed, it is only with a firm
command of the relevant rules, case law, and practical considerations
that a court can adequately navigate through the discovery sanction
process and emerge with an order that not only is just but also can
survive an appeal.
One of the goals of this Article is to assist judges and practitioners in
better understanding discovery sanctions under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 219(c). 3 It is the authors' hope that, with a greater understanding
3. Rule 219(c) provides:
(c) Failure to Comply with Order or Rules. If a party, or any person at the instance of
or in collusion with a party, unreasonably fails to comply with any provision of part E
of article II of the rules of this court (Discovery, Requests for Admission, and Pretrial
Procedure) or fails to comply with any order entered under these rules, the court, on
motion, may enter, in addition to remedies elsewhere specifically provided, such orders
as are just, including, among others, the following:
(i) That further proceedings be stayed until the order or rule is complied with;
(ii) That the offending party be debarred from filing any other pleading relating
to any issue to which the refusal or failure relates;
(iii) That the offending party be debarred from maintaining any particular claim,
counterclaim, third-party complaint, or defense relating to that issue;
(iv) That a witness be barred from testifying concerning that issue;
(v) That, as to claims or defenses asserted in any pleading to which that issue is
material, a judgment by default be entered against the offending party or that
the offending party's action be dismissed with or without prejudice; or
(vi) That any portion of the offending party's pleadings relating to that issue be
stricken and, if thereby made appropriate, judgment be entered as to that
issue.
(vii) That in cases where a money judgment is entered against a party subject to
sanctions under this subparagraph, order the offending party to pay interest
at the rate provided by law for judgments for any period of pretrial delay
attributable to the offending party's conduct.
In lieu of or in addition to the foregoing, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, may impose upon the offending party or his or her attorney, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties
the amount of reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the misconduct, including a
reasonable attorney fee, and when the misconduct is wilful, a monetary penalty. When
appropriate, the court may, by contempt proceedings, compel obedience by any party
or person to any subpoena issued or order entered under these rules. Notwithstanding
the entry of a judgment or an order of dismissal, whether voluntary or involuntary, the
trial court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce, on its own motion or on the motion of
any party, any order imposing monetary sanctions, including such orders as may be
entered on motions which were pending hereunder prior to the filing of a notice or
motion seeking a judgment or order of dismissal.
Where a sanction is imposed under paragraph (c), the judge shall set forth with
specificity the reasons and basis of any sanctions so imposed either in the judgment
order itself or in a separate written order.
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of the complexities of Rule 219(c), the need to resort to discovery
sanctions can be reduced. It is also hoped that, through this Article,
courts will become better equipped to respond to allegations of serious
discovery misconduct. This latter objective is a recognition that no
matter how much education and guidance may exist, some litigants and
attorneys will continue to abuse the discovery process.
In an effort to achieve the abovementioned goals, Part II of this
Article discusses the purposes and scope of Rule 2 19(c). 4  Part III
compares and contrasts Rule 219(c) with Rule 137, the other Illinois
Supreme Court rule through which a trial court can sanction an attorney
or party for a discovery violation.5  Part IV then analyzes factors that
courts consider when determining whether to impose discovery
sanctions under Rule 219(c). 6  Part V discusses what options are
available to ensure that a court's order is 'just" 7 when a court elects to
sanction an attorney or other offending party. 8  Part VI suggests a
proposal for altering the rationale governing Rule 219(c) for cases in
which allegations of serious discovery misconduct have been
substantiated.9 The authors provide suggestions and recommendations
throughout this Article where no clear guidance exists.
II. THE PURPOSES AND EXPANSIVE SCOPE OF RULE 219(c)
Rule 219(c) is designed to coerce compliance with discovery rules
and orders, not to punish dilatory parties. 10 To this end, courts should
strive to strike a balance between enforcing discovery rules and
resolving cases on the merits.I Courts are assisted in carrying out these
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c).
4. See infra Part II (exploring the purposes and scope of Rule 219(c)).
5. See infra Part III (comparing Rule 219(c) and Rule 137).
6. See infra Part IV (discussing factors that courts take into account when determining
whether to impose sanctions under Rule 219(c)).
7. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c) (stating that "the court... may enter.., such orders as are just").
8. See infra Part V (analyzing what options are available to ensure that a court's sanction
order is just).
9. See infSa Part VI (arguing that Rule 219(c) should adopt the purpose of Rule 137 by
imposing punishment for serious discovery misconduct).
10. Blakey v. Gilbane Bldg. Corp., 708 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1999)
("When imposing sanctions, the court's purpose is to coerce compliance with discovery rules and
orders, not to punish the dilatory party.").
11. Id. ("A just order of sanctions under Rule 219(c) is one which, to the degree possible,
ensures both discovery and a trial on the merits."); see also Bachman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 776
N.E.2d 262, 290 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2002) ("In fashioning a sanction, the court must weigh the
competing interests of the offending party's right to maintain a lawsuit against the need to
accomplish the objectives of discovery and promote the unimpeded flow of litigation."): Kathleen
M. Potocki, Comment, Policing Discovery Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 2 19 (c): A Search
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goals through the expansive scope of Rule 219(c), manifested in both
the plain language of the rule and the case law construing it.
First, the language of Rule 219(c) is couched in broad terms. For
example, Rule 219(c) provides that "any person" who unreasonably
fails to comply with any provision of the Illinois Supreme Court's
discovery rules, or any order entered pursuant to these rules, may be
subject to pre-trial sanctions. 12 Thus, the use of "any person" allows an
offending party to be-an individual other than an attorney. 13 Further,
when imposing sanctions, the court is free to fashion any order that is
'just."'14 A just order can range from a mere oral reprimand to dismissal
of the dilatory party's cause of action with prejudice. 15  The primary
limitation on the court is that the sanction order cannot amount to
punishment of the dilatory party. 16
Second, a party can be subject to sanctions under Rule 219(c) for
conduct that took place even before a lawsuit was filed. Courts have
held that a pre-suit duty exists to ensure that evidence is maintained
properly. 17 For example, it is sanctionable conduct to destroy relevant
evidence, such as a steering mechanism in an automobile accident case,
prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 18
for Judicial Consistency, 21 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 973, 977-78 (1990) ("Rule 219(c) purports to
strike a balance between enforcing discovery rules and resolving cases on the merits.").
12. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c); see also supra note 3 (detailing Rule 219(c)).
13. See Workman v. St. Therese Med. Ctr., 640 N.E.2d 349, 354 (Il. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1994)
(dismissing the cause with prejudice where, inter alia, plaintiff failed to comply with discovery
deadlines ordered by the trial court and failed to pay monetary sanctions that were also ordered by
the trial court); see also Hartnett v. Stack, 607 N.E.2d 703, 711 (Il. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1993)
(ordering the pleading struck and default judgment entered where, inter alia, defendant failed to
follow the trial court's orders to file an affidavit, answer interrogatories, supply requested
documentation, and appear at a deposition).
14. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c); see also supra note 3 (providing the language of Rule 219(c)).
15. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c). The sanction options enumerated are not the only sanctions
upon which a court may draw in fashioning a sanction order; a court may impose a sanction that
is less onerous than those options that are enumerated in Rule 219(c), as long as the sanction
order does not amount to a punishment and is just. See Dyduch v. Crystal Green Corp., 582
N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1991) (finding that trial courts are not limited to the
sanctions listed in Rule 219 for discovery misconduct and may enter such orders that are just, as
long as the order does not inflict punishment).
16. Blakey v. Gilbane Bldg. Corp., 708 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1999)
(holding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering dismissal with prejudice as a
sanction).
17. See Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ill. 1998) ("[A] potential
litigant owes a duty to take reasonable measures to preserve the integrity of relevant and material
evidence." A breach of this pre-suit duty can lead to the imposition of sanctions.).
18. Id. (holding that the trial court had authority to impose a sanction on plaintiffs for the
destructive testing of evidence); see also infra notes 127-65 (discussing the opinion in
Shimanovsky).
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Third, an attorney or party can also be subject to sanctions after the
underlying lawsuit has been dismissed. Under Rule 219(c), the court
retains jurisdiction to sanction a dilatory party after the lawsuit has been
dismissed. 19
Finally, courts are endowed with broad discretion to determine
whether to impose sanctions and, if so, the type of sanction to impose
on dilatory parties for discovery violations.20  As a consequence of its
broad mandate, Rule 219(c) brings a wide range of misconduct under its
ambit.
III. RULE 219(c) COMPARED TO RULE 137
A. General2' Principles Under Rule 137
Rule 219(c) is not the only vehicle by which a court can sanction
discovery misconduct. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 is also
available to trial courts in this regard.22 Under Rule 137, the party who
19. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c) (noting that the trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce a
monetary sanction order, even after the underlying case has been dismissed); see also
Transamerica Ins. Group v. Lee, 518 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987) (imposing
monetary sanctions, by the trial court, at a hearing conducted after the court granted summary
judgment in favor of plaintiff).
20. Peterson v. Ress Enters., Inc., 686 N.E.2d 631, 640 (I1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1997) ("The
decision to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 219(c), and, if so, the type of sanction, is largely
within the sound discretion of the trial court .... "); see also Potocki, supra note I1, at 978-79
(explaining that trial courts have "vast discretion" to determine whether to impose sanctions and,
if so, what the appropriate sanction should be).
21. The authors intend for their discussion of Rule 137 to be illustrative, not comprehensive.
22. In pertinent part, Rule 137 provides:
Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall
be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading,
motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party,
or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party
or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney fee.
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requests that sanctions be imposed bears the burden of proof.23
Specifically, the party petitioning for sanctions must show that the
opposing party made untrue and false allegations without reasonable
cause.
2 4
Rule 137 requires a party or litigant to: (1) sign pleadings and other
papers to certify that he or she has read the document; (2) make
reasonable inquiry into the basis of the lawsuit; (3) believe that the
lawsuit is well-grounded both in fact and in law, or that there is a good-
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law; and (4) not interpose the suit for any improper purpose, such as
harassment, unnecessary delay, or needless increase in the cost of
litigation 25
While Rule 219(c) and Rule 137 are both sanction provisions and
share various similarities to one another,26 there are significant
distinctions that characterize the respective rules. Three important areas
in which the two rules differ include their rationales, the different levels
of specificity that are required, and whether a hearing is required to
determine if a sanction should be imposed. A discussion of these
differences follows.
B. Contrasting Goals: Punishment Versus Balance
Rule 219(c) and Rule 137 have strikingly different rationales, despite
the fact that both are sanction provisions. Rule 137 is directed at
punishing parties found to be in violation of its requirements. 27 As a
result of this penal focus, the provisions of Rule 137 must be strictly
construed. 28 Accordingly, under the strict construction of Rule 137,
sanctions cannot be imposed for all acts of misconduct. Rather,
Where a sanction is imposed under this rule, the judge shall set forth with
specificity the reasons and basis of any sanction so imposed either in the judgment
order itself or in a separate written order.
ILL. SuP. CT. R. 137.
23. Tech. Innovation Ctr., Inc. v. Advanced Multiuser Techs., 732 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000) (citing Yassin v. Certified Grocers of Ill., 551 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (I11.
1990)); see also infra Part IV (discussing the burden shifting scheme under Rule 219(c)).
24. Tech. Innovation Ctr., 732 N.E.2d at 1134 (citing In re Estate of Wernick, 535 N.E.2d
876, 883 (Ill. 1989)).
25. Rankin v. Heidlebaugh, 747 N.E.2d 483, 486 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2001) (citing ILL.
SUP. CT. R. 137).
26. See infra Part VI (explaining that Rule 219(c) has adopted some of the language and
requirements of Rule 137).
27. Rankin, 747 N.E.2d at 488 ("The purpose of Rule 137 is to prevent the abuse of the
judicial process by penalizing those who bring vexatious or harassing actions without sufficient
foundation.").
28. Id.
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sanctions can be imposed only for the filing of pleadings, motions, or
other paper in violation of the rule itself.29
In contrast, Rule 219(c) does not focus on punishing dilatory parties.
Indeed, punishing a party under Rule 219(c) can be grounds for
reversal. 30 Instead, sanctions under Rule 219(c) are designed to strike a
balance 31 between enforcing discovery rules and resolving cases on the
merits. 32
The lines of demarcation between the rules are clear in the context of
a violation of a pre-trial court order. In this setting, it is Rule 219(c),
not Rule 137, that governs. 33 Rule 137 is triggered only when a
pleading or other paper has been filed.34 Pleadings are generally not at
issue when a court issues a pre-trial order, such as an order compelling a
party to submit to a deposition. However, a degree of ambiguity comes
into play in the context of a written discovery violation (that is, where a
pleading has been filed). In such an instance, both rules could
theoretically apply, as the pleading and filing requirements of Rule 137
have been satisfied. For example, either rule could govern in a situation
in which a pleading was filed that was allegedly intentionally untrue or
29. In re Marriage of Adler, 648 N.E.2d 953, 957 (II1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1995) ("By its terms,
[Rule 137] authorizes the imposition of sanctions against a party or his attorney for filing a
pleading, motion, or other paper that is not well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or
which has been interposed for any improper purpose.").
30. See Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 293 (I11. 1998) (finding that
dismissal of the cause of action with prejudice, without any regard to the unique facts of the case
or the relevant factors employed to determine an appropriate sanction, constituted a punishment);
see also Dyduch v. Crystal Green Corp., 582 N.E.2d 302, 307 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1991)
(finding that the trial court's award of fees and costs was a punishment where the fees and costs
were out of proportion to the level of discovery misconduct).
31. An alternative theory to proper balance is grounded in deterring future discovery abuse.
Under this view, any balancing must take into consideration the use of serious sanctions to curb
noncompliance in the judicial system as a whole. See Potocki, supra note II, at 978; see also
Workman v. St. Therese Med. Ctr., 640 N.E.2d 349, 354 (III. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1994) ("[lI]t is also
appropriate to consider the need for using discovery sanctions as a general deterrent which will
provide a strong incentive for all litigants to fully ... comply with discovery rules.").
32. Blakey v. Gilbane Bldg. Corp., 708 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1999) ("A
just order of sanctions under Rule 219(c) is one which, to the degree possible, ensures both
discovery and a trial on the merits."); see also Bachman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 776 N.E.2d 262,
290 (II1. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2002) ("In fashioning a sanction, the court must weigh the competing
interests of the offending party's right to maintain a lawsuit against the need to accomplish the
objectives of discovery and promote the unimpeded flow of litigation."); Potocki, supra note 11,
at 977-78 ("Rule 219(c) purports to strike a balance between enforcing discovery rules and
resolving cases on the merits.").
33. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c) (stating that a court may impose sanctions on a party who fails
to comply with a court order pertaining to, inter alia, discovery).
34. In re Marriage of Adler, 648 N.E.2d at 957 ("Rule 137 does not authorize a trial court to
impose sanctions for all acts of misconduct... only for the filing of pleadings, motions, or other
papers in violation of the rule itself." (emphasis added)).
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the result of an inadequate investigation. In this setting, which rule is
the proper procedural vehicle with which to analyze the alleged
misdeed? Consistent with its broad discretion, a court is free to choose
either rule, as long as the court first considers the purposes behind each
rule.35
C. The Specificity Requirements
1. Petition Specificity
Both rules impose a number of procedural safeguards on litigants and
the courts. One of these requirements concerns the level of specificity
that is necessary for a proper petition for sanctions. Under Rule 137, a
sanction petition must identify: (1) the offending pleading, motion, or
other paper; (2) which statements in the document are false; and (3) the
fees and costs that have directly resulted from the untrue allegations.
36
This level of specificity is required to afford the responding party an
opportunity to challenge and defend against the allegations and to
enable the trial court to make a determination of the reasonable
expenses that were a consequence of the alleged misdeeds.37
However, no such petition-drafting guidance exists under Rule
219(c). To date, no reviewing court has addressed whether a petition
for sanctions under Rule 219(c) requires a similar level of specificity as
petitions do under Rule 137. Nevertheless, prudence dictates that
attorneys file Rule 2 19(c) sanction petitions that comply with the same
specificity standards as those required under Rule 137. This practice
exists because the reasoning that underlies Rule 137 petition drafting
also applies to petitions under Rule 219(c).
First, as under Rule 137, persons alleged to have violated Rule 219(c)
should have the opportunity to challenge and defend against the
misconduct allegations. The imposition of sanctions under Rule 219(c)
can produce serious consequences. For example, while sanctions under
219(c) are not designed to punish, a stigma is clearly associated with
35. See William J. Templeman Co. v. W.E. O'Neil Constr. Co., Nos. 1-96-3434 & 1-96-3557,
1998 I11. App. LEXIS 587 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Aug. 19, 1998) (finding that a discovery
violation can be sanctioned under Rule 137 as long as a writing is involved); see also Evers v.
Edward Hosp. Ass'n, 617 N.E.2d 1211, 1226 (I1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1993) (noting that the court
should consider the purpose that underlies the respective rules before deciding which rule is more
appropriate in a discovery dispute).
36. In re Marriage of Adler, 648 N.E.2d at 957.
37. Id.
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having sanctions imposed on an attorney or a party. 38 No attorney or
party desires to have his or her reputation tarnished by a court sanction.
Further, discovery sanctions under Rule 219(c) can have a substantial
monetary or evidentiary impact on a party or case, including the
termination of the litigation.39  A detailed sanction petition and a
detailed response allow the dilatory party a greater opportunity to
challenge the allegations, as he or she is armed with additional
information with which to mount a defense.
Second, like Rule 137, a detailed sanction petition also provides the
court with a basis with which to assess the reasonableness of the fees
requested. Indeed, short of a hearing on fees, the petition may be the
only source of information detailing the nature and extent of the
expenses borne by counsel. Thus, like the rationale underlying Rule
137 petition specificity, the goals of Rule 219(c) are best achieved with
both a detailed sanction petition and a detailed response to the sanction
petition.
2. Court Rationale Specificity
Under both rules, once a court decides to impose sanctions on a
dilatory party, it must "set forth with specificity" its rationale for so
ruling in the judgment order or in a separate written order.40 Specific
findings by the trial court are necessary to enable a reviewing court to
determine whether: (1) the trial court's decision was an informed one;
(2) the decision was based on valid reasons that fit the case; and (3) the
decision followed logically from the application of the reasons stated to
the particular circumstances of the case.41
Under Rule 137, not only must the trial court specify the reasons and
basis of any sanction, it must also specify the manner in which it
computed the sanction when the sanction is substantial.42 Trial courts
38. See infra note 168 (stating that dishonest and lazy attorneys should be sanctioned under
137). It is difficult to imagine that an attorney would desire to have his or her conduct
characterized in this way.
39. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c) (noting that a court may impose a sanction that will result in a
default judgment or the dismissal of the cause of action with prejudice); see also infra notes 113-
26 and accompanying text (discussing the dismissal of the cause in Sander v. Dow Chemical Co.,
651 N.E.2d 1071, 1081 (II1. 1995), for willful violation of a court order).
40. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 137 ("Where a sanction is imposed under this rule, the judge shall set
forth with specificity the reasons and basis of any sanction so imposed either in the judgment
order itself or in a separate written order."); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c) ("Where a sanction is
imposed ... the judge shall set forth with specificity the reasons and basis of any sanction so
imposed either in the judgment order itself or in a separate written order.").
41. In re Marriage of Schneider, 697 N.E.2d 1161, 1163-65 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998).
42. In re Marriage of Adler. 648 N.E.2d at 957 (entering a judgment in the amount of
$25,000).
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may also be required to specify reasons when they decide to deny
sanction petitions.
43
What level of specificity is required under Rule 219(c)? Guidance on
this question is provided in two appellate court decisions. In Chabowski
v. Vacation Village Ass'n,44 the trial court dismissed a plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice, after the plaintiff, inter alia, violated a court
order by failing to appear for depositions on two occasions and failing
to appear for court hearings on two occasions. 45 On appeal, the plaintiff
argued, inter alia, that the trial court committed reversible error by not
indicating in writing the reasons for its decision.46
The appellate court affirmed. 47 It noted that the trial court's failure to
state its reasons in writing was not per se reversible error because the
dismissal order was entered pursuant to a written motion by defendants,
which articulated the reasons for dismissal, and the reasons for the
dismissal were supported by the record.48
In Wright v. Desate, Inc.,4 9 the plaintiffs filed a complaint against
Sears, Roebuck & Co. and several other defendants after one of the
plaintiffs was injured while unloading a truck at a Sears warehouse. 50
In a pre-trial motion, Sears sought to bar testimony of two of the
plaintiffs' expert witnesses because the plaintiffs had not responded to
discovery requests in a timely manner. 51 Without stating any basis for
the determination in its written order, the trial court granted the motion
to bar.52  At the conclusion of a hearing on a written motion to
reconsider, the judge stated, inter alia:
I think it should have been abundantly clear to the plaintiff, and I think
I made it clear, that the case would not be continued beyond
December and that it would be tried this year. And then to wait until
the middle of November to notice up the evidence depositions of two
essential witnesses seems to me a pretty fast and loose method of
handling cases .... 53
43. See N. Shore Sign Co. v. Signature Design Group, Inc., 604 N.E.2d 1157, 1163 (I11. App.
Ct. 2d Dist. 1992) ("[W]e believe the trial court must at least express succinctly the basis for its
decision even when it denies a motion for sanctions.").
44. Chabowski v. Vacation Vill. Ass'n, 690 N.E.2d 115 (11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1997).
45. Id. at 117.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 119.
48. Id.
49. Wright v. Desate, Inc., 686 N.E.2d 1199 (111. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1997).
50. Id. at 1200.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1201.
53. Id. at 1200-01.
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On appeal, one of the questions addressed was whether the order
barring the plaintiffs' experts from testifying should be vacated because
it failed to specify the basis for the sanction.54 Relying heavily on the
reasoning in Chabowski, the Wright court affirmed, finding that the
reasons for the sanction were specifically stated in both the written
motion to bar the testimony and the written reply to the motion to
reconsider.55 The court also found a sufficient basis in the record for
the trial court's ruling, noting that the trial judge's findings were clearly
articulated at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to reconsider
hearing. 56 As a result, the court found that it could make an informed
decision regarding the appropriateness of the order from the record. 57
In sum, under Chabowski and Wright, a court is not required to draft
a written opinion articulating its legal basis for imposing sanctions
under 219(c). Rather, a court can satisfy the specificity requirement of
Rule 219(c) by adopting the reasoning of a written motion in which the
rationale for sanctions is expressed, as well as by articulating the
reasons for imposing sanctions on the record.58
D. The Hearing Requirements
Is an evidentiary hearing required before a court imposes discovery
sanctions? It depends. Under Rule 137, such a hearing should always
be held when a sanction award is based on a pleading filed for an
improper purpose, such as harassment of an opponent.59 When a court
is called upon to determine if an untrue statement within a pleading was
made without reasonable cause, however, the court is not required to
conduct a hearing if it can make a determination based upon the
pleadings or the trial evidence. 60 Once the court finds that a pleading is
sanctionable, Rule 137 requires an evidentiary hearing on the
reasonableness of any fee to be awarded. 6 1 A fee hearing is required
because the issue of reasonableness is a matter of proof that should be
subject to cross-examination. 62
54. Id. at 1201.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1202.
58. Id.
59. Century Rd. Builders, Inc. v. City of Palos Heights, 670 N.E.2d 836, 838 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1996).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 839.
62. Id.
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When a court proceeds under Rule 219(c), case law suggests, but
does not require, that the trial court conduct a hearing on the merits. In
Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp.,63 the appellate court held that a
party is not automatically entitled to a specific sanction just because
evidence is destroyed or altered. 64 Instead, a court must consider the
unique factual situation of the case presented and apply the appropriate
criteria in determining what sanction, if any, it should impose.65 The
appellate court reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to
conduct a hearing to determine the degree of prejudice the defendant
suffered as a result of the plaintiffs' alteration of evidence. 66 The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling.67 The
supreme court added that once the trial court ascertained the level of the
defendant's prejudice, it was required to determine what sanction, if
any, was warranted. 68
While no bright line rule was announced, Shimanovsky appears to
endorse the practice of trial courts conducting hearings to determine
what sanction should be imposed. It is through this approach that a trial
court is poised to "consider the unique factual situation that each case
presents," and after consideration, impose a just order.69
Rule 219(c), like Rule 137, provides that appropriate sanctions can
include "a reasonable attorney fee." 70  Surprisingly, courts of review
have provided little guidance on whether a hearing by the trial court is
required to determine the "reasonableness" of the fee. For example, in
Transamerica Insurance Group v. Lee,71 the majority held that the trial
court's award to the plaintiff of twice the amount of her attorney's fees
as a penalty against the defendant was not an abuse of discretion. 72 The
majority reasoned that a penalty sanction was "just" because it was a
means of discouraging litigants from considering discovery violations
63. Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 648 N.E.2d 91 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994), modified,
aff'd, remanded by 692 N.E.2d 286 (I11. 1998).
64. Id. at 96-97.
65. Id. at 97.
66. Id. at 97-98.
67. Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Il1. 1998).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 292-93.
70. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 219(c); see also supra note 3 (detailing Rule 219(c)).
71. Transamerica Ins. Group v. Lee, 518 N.E.2d 413 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987).
72. Id. at415.
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as a litigation strategy 73 and a vehicle through which the courts could
avoid additional burdens on their resources. 74
In a vigorous dissent, Justice McMorrow argued, inter alia, that the
majority's award of fees without an evidentiary hearing by the trial
court to determine the award's reasonableness was an abuse of
discretion. 75  Justice McMorrow noted that Rule 219(c) provides that
"the award of attorney fees must be 'reasonable' and 'incurred by [the
innocent] party as a result of the misconduct.' 76  Justice McMorrow
concluded that the case record did not demonstrate evidence of any
prejudice to plaintiff by the defendant's discovery violation. 77
Therefore, Justice McMorrow would have reversed the trial court's
decision and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing on the
reasonableness of the attorney's fees actually incurred by plaintiff due
to the discovery violation. 78
Other reviewing courts have concurred with Justice McMorrow's
reasoning on the question of monetary sanctions. 79 No court, however,
has stated that a fee hearing must be conducted pursuant to Rule
2 19(c). 80  Despite the paucity of authority on this matter, the sound
practice would be for trial courts to conduct such a hearing. Like Rule
137, the "reasonableness" of the fee is at issue when courts impose fee
sanctions under Rule 219(c). 8 1  Therefore, a hearing should be
conducted "because the issue of reasonableness is a matter of proof that
should be subject to cross-examination." 82  At a minimum, if a court
73. Id. at 416 ("If the only sanction imposed upon discovery of the violation is the payment of
attorney fees and costs, it may prove a cost effective measure to be tried in future cases.").
74. Id. ("Additionally, and at least as significant as the burden on the plaintiff is the burden on
the courts struggling to handle the massive amount of pending litigation.").
75. Id. at 419 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (quoting ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c)).
77. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
79. See, e.g., Dyduch v. Crystal Green Corp., 582 N.E.2d 302, 307 (I1. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
1991) ("We agree with Justice McMorrow and her conclusion that monetary sanctions pursuant
to Rule 219(c) are limited to the reasonable expenses incurred by the innocent party as a result of
the misconduct.").
80. Perhaps the closest the courts have come to endorsing the concept of a fee hearing under
Rule 219(c) was in a case in which the appellate court cited the use of a fee hearing approvingly
in affirming the reasonableness of a fee award. See Martzaklis v. 5559 Belmont Corp., 510
N.E.2d 1148, 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987) ("In determining the amount of fees to be
awarded to plaintiffs attorneys, the trial court reviewed... the hearing testimony and concluded
that the time claimed was necessary.").
81. Compare ILL. SUP. CT. R. 137, with ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c).
82. Century Rd. Builders Inc. v. City of Palos Heights, 670 N.E.2d 836, 839 (Il. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1996) (vacating and remanding the trial court's order for sanctions where the trial court
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elects not to hold such a hearing, it should review and cite time records
and affidavits in making its findings.83
IV. FACTORS COURTS CONSIDER IN DETERMINING WHETHER
TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 219(C)
A. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(k)
As a threshold matter, litigants must comply with Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 201(k) before filing a motion for sanctions. 84 Rule 201(k)
provides as follows: "Every motion with respect to discovery shall
incorporate a statement that counsel responsible for trial of the case
after personal consultation and reasonable attempts to resolve
differences have been unable to reach an accord.... 85  The purpose
behind Rule 201(k) is to urge counsel to adopt a spirit of cooperation
with regard to discovery. Counsel is not to "use discovery rules to
engage in 'harassment, delay, and pettifoggery.' 86
Strict compliance with Rule 201(k) is generally required in that
counsel responsible for trial must make reasonable attempts to resolve
differences over discovery with opposing counsel prior to the filing of a
sanction petition. 87  Ideally, this Rule 201(k) compliance statement
should be a part of the sanction petition.
B. Unreasonable Noncompliance
Once Rule 201(k) has been satisfied, the court must decide whether
or not to impose sanctions. The critical inquiry at this stage is to assess
the reasonableness of the discovery noncompliance. 88 Unreasonable
noncompliance can be defined as a "deliberate, contumacious, or
failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the sanctions motion or a hearing on the
reasonableness of the fees awarded).
83. See Martzaklis, 510 N.E.2d at 1151 (affirming a trial court on the amount of fees awarded,
where "the trial court reviewed the pleadings, the time records of counsel and the hearing
testimony and concluded that the time claimed was necessary").
84. Antkiewicz v. Pax/Indianapolis, Inc., 627 N.E.2d 185, 189 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993).
85. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(k).
86. In re Marriage of Lai, 625 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993) (quoting Spiller
v. Cont'l Tube Co., 434 N.E.2d 850, 853 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1982)).
87. In re Estate of Andernovics, 759 N.E.2d 501, 508 (I11. 2001).
88. See id. at 507 ("A party disputing a sanction order for failure to comply with discovery
must establish that noncompliance was reasonable or justified under the circumstances."); see
also Workman v. St. Therese Med. Ctr., 640 N.E.2d 349, 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1994)
("[Slanction orders under Rule 219(c) are to be imposed only when the noncompliance is
unreasonable and the order entered is just.").
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unwarranted disregard of the court's authority." 89  Alternatively,
unreasonable compliance can be "a deliberate and pronounced disregard
both for the discovery rules and for the court."90  Unreasonable
noncompliance with discovery rules can be determined, in part, by the
importance of the information or product that has not been produced,
rather than by the fault of the dilatory party. 91
Initially, the burden is on the complainant to show that the
noncompliance was unreasonable. 92 Once the court establishes that the
dilatory party was noncompliant, the burden shifts, and the dilatory
party has the burden of demonstrating that the noncompliance was
reasonable or justified under the circumstances. 93
The court's assessment of the alleged unreasonable noncompliance
should begin with a detailed sanction petition and a detailed response to
the petition. It is through this procedure that a court can make a
threshold determination as to whether or not the alleged misconduct was
deliberate. If the court is satisfied that the alleged violation warrants
further attention, it should consider holding an evidentiary hearing on
the merits to assess the validity of the allegations.
C. Sanction Considerations
The factors a trial court must use in determining what sanction, if
any, to apply include:
(1) the surprise to the adverse party; (2) the prejudicial effect of the
proffered testimony or evidence; 94 1 (3) the nature of the testimony or
evidence; (4) the diligence of the adverse party in seeking discovery;
(5) the timeliness of the adverse party's objection to the testimony or
89. Blott v. Hanson, 670 N.E.2d 345, 349 (111. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1996).
90. Gausselin v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 631 N.E.2d 1246, 1256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1994).
91. Shelbyville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Leisure Prods. Co., 634 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (I11.
App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1994); see also Leonard E. Gross, Supreme Court Rule 219: The Consequences
of Refusal to Comply with Rules or Orders Relating to Discovery or Pretrial Conferences, 24
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 471, 479 (1993) (noting that courts should consider the importance of the
information withheld to determine what type of sanction to impose, not whether sanctions are
appropriate).
92. Potocki, supra note 11, at 979 ("Determining whether a party's noncompliance is
,unreasonable' is a question of fact with the burden of proof on the complainant.").
93. In re Estate of Andernovics, 759 N.E.2d 501, 507 (Il. 2001).
94. Considerations relevant in determining the degree of prejudice include "the strength of the
undisclosed evidence, the likelihood that prior notice could have helped the opposing party
discredit the evidence, the feasibility of continuance rather than a more drastic sanction, and the
willfulness of the opposing party in failing to disclose the witness." Phillips v. Gannotti, 763
N.E.2d 820, 826 (III. App. Ct. Ist Dist. 2002).
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evidence; and (6) the good faith of the party offering the testimony or
evidence.
95
However, no single factor is determinative.96
Practical considerations also come into play in the discovery
sanctions analysis. In particular, courts should be mindful that proper
compliance with Rule 219(c) for serious discovery misconduct could be
a time consuming and contentious endeavor, especially if they conduct
an evidentiary hearing. Proper compliance with all of the procedural
safeguards mandated under Rule 219(c) will likely require the
investment of significant judicial resources. For example, if the court
elects to sanction a dilatory party, the court will be called on to monitor
all aspects of the discovery sanction process, from ensuring compliance
with Rule 201(k) to making certain that the court's sanction order is
sufficiently specific. 97 It is only through this type of time commitment
that a court can ensure that its order will withstand an appeal.
Beyond the required safeguards, courts should also give careful
attention to whether it should provide protections that are not mandated,
such as a hearing on the merits or a hearing on fees. Unlike its
counterpart, Rule 137, Rule 219(c) does not require an evidentiary
hearing on the merits or on the fees. 98 It would, however, be prudent
practice for courts to conduct such hearings. As described in greater
detail below, the court's consideration of testimony can be decisive in
reaching a just order.99
In terms of the acrimonious nature of the discovery sanction process,
it is important to consider what is at stake. The party requesting that the
discovery sanction be imposed is asking the court to find that the
adverse attorney or party has engaged in some form of misconduct.
This "wrong" might range from laziness to a lack of candor, or it may
be an honest mistake. 1°° Therefore, the process will be "intensely
personal" at every stage of the sanction process, as the party alleged to
have engaged in the serious discovery misconduct will likely mount a
vigorous defense to clear his or her name. 10 1 Moreover, the imposition
95. Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 291 (Ill. 1998).
96. Id.
97. See In re Estate of Andernovics, 759 N.E.2d at 507-08 (detailing the steps that a trial court
took before ultimately dismissing a plaintiffs complaint for failure to comply with discovery
orders); see also ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c) (discussing the specificity requirement).
98. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c); see also supra note 3 (detailing Rule 219(c)).
99. See infra Part V (discussing the appropriate method for imposing sanctions).
100. See Timberlake & Pionk, supra note 1, at 1048 (illustrating a variety of litigant behaviors
but cautioning that "Rule 137 should be reserved for dishonest litigants, lazy or careless
attorneys, and the dilettantes of trial practice").
101. Id.
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of discovery sanctions could have dramatic consequences, resulting, for
example, in large fee awards or the end of the lawsuit. In short,
emotions will likely be running high, as reputations, parties' rights, and
large sums of money will be at stake. By understanding the legal and
practical considerations that come into play, the trial judge will be better
prepared to fulfill his or her vital role.
V. THE IMPOSITION OF APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS
A. Imposing Just Orders
If a court elects to impose discovery sanctions, it may enter any order
that is "just, ' 02 where a party fails to comply with discovery rules or
any order entered under the discovery rules. 10 3 But what constitutes a
just order? A just sanction order is one that, to the degree possible,
strikes a balance "between enforcing discovery rules and resolving
cases on the merits." 1°4 In determining the type of sanction to impose,
courts should consider the same factors they evaluate when deciding
whether to impose a sanction.10 5
In arriving at a just order, the trial court has a broad mandate. The
decision to impose sanctions under Rule 219(c), as well as the type of
sanction to impose, is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court. 10 6 A reviewing court will uphold a sanction order, absent an
abuse of discretion, such as the entry of an unjust order where the
record demonstrates that the accused party's conduct was not
unreasonable. 107
102. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c); see also supra note 3 (detailing Rule 219(c)); supra notes 14-16
and accompanying text (explaining that a just order can range from an oral reprimand to a
dismissal with prejudice).
103. Blakey v. Gilbane Bldg. Corp., 708 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1999).
104. Id.; see also Bachman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 776 N.E.2d 262, 290 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist.
2002) ("In fashioning a sanction, the court must weigh the competing interests of the offending
party's right to maintain a lawsuit against the need to accomplish the objectives of discovery and
promote the unimpeded flow of litigation."), appeal denied by 202 11. 2d 598 (2002); Potocki,
supra note 11, at 977-78 (explaining that "Rule 219(c) purports to strike a balance between
enforcing discovery rules and resolving cases on the merits").
105. Brooke Inns, Inc. v. S & R Hi-Fi & TV, 618 N.E.2d 734, 746 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1993); see also supra Part IV.C (discussing the factors a court should consider when determining
whether to impose discovery sanctions).
106. Peterson v. Ress Enters., 686 N.E.2d 631, 640 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1997).
107. Wegman v. Pratt, 579 N.E.2d 1035, 1041-42 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1991); see also
Buffington v. Yungen, 748 N.E.2d 844, 847-48 (Il1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2001) (concluding that the
trial court abused its discretion when it entered a default judgment against a party that failed to
timely respond to discovery because there was no evidence of a "deliberate, contumacious
disregard of the court's discovery orders").
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B. Sanction Options
Rule 219(c) enumerates certain options that a court may consider in
fashioning a discovery sanction order. These options include: (1)
staying proceedings until the offending party has complied with an
order or rule; (2) prohibiting the offending party from filing any other
pleading relating to any issue to which the refusal or failure relates; (3)
prohibiting the offending party from maintaining any particular claim,
counterclaim, third-party complaint, or defense related to that issue; (4)
barring witness testimony; (5) entering a default judgment or a
dismissal of claims or defenses with or without prejudice; (6) striking a
portion of the offending party's pleadings; and (7) where a money
judgment is imposed as a Rule 219(c) sanction, ordering the offending
party to pay interest at the rate provided by law for judgments for any
period of pretrial delay attributable to the offending party's conduct. 10 8
The court may impose other appropriate sanctions in addition to or in
lieu of the seven options provided for in Rule 219(c). 10 9 Other possible
sanctions referred to in Rule 219(c) include reasonable attorney's fees, a
monetary penalty for willful conduct, and the institution of contempt
proceedings.' I0
C. Drastic Sanctions
This Article has focused on serious discovery misconduct.
Accordingly, it is appropriate to describe what recourse is available to a
court when it determines that the allegations of serious abuse have been
substantiated.Ill An order of dismissal with prejudice or a sanction that
results in a default judgment is regarded as a drastic sanction to be
employed only as a last resort. 112 Thus, these sanctions should be
108. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c); see also supra note 3 (detailing Rule 219(c)).
109. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c); see also Nasrallah v. Davilla, 762 N.E.2d 25, 32 (Il. App. Ct.
1st Dist. 2001) (finding that a willful violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 237 allowed for the
imposition of any sanction under Rule 219(c), including an adverse inference jury instruction);
Dyduch v. Crystal Green Corp., 582 N.E.2d 302, 307 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1991) (noting that
"the trial court is not limited to the sanctions enumerated in Rule 219(c) for discovery
violations"); Gross, supra note 91, at 484 (noting that two sanction examples not specified under
Rule 219(c) that are available to a court include awarding a new trial and using an unfavorable
jury instruction).
110. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c); see also supra note 3 (providing the language of Rule 219(c)).
11. Necessarily, if the facts bear out that the dilatory party did not engage in willful
misconduct, the court should impose a less severe discovery sanction, such as barring claims or
defenses. Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 293 (I1. 1998); see also Gross,
supra note 91, at 491 (describing dismissal and default judgment as "last resort" sanctions under
Rule 219(c)).
112. Shimanovsky, 692 N.E.2d at 291. Illinois courts have also characterized lesser sanctions
as drastic when the underlying conduct was not sufficiently egregious. See, e.g., Phillips v.
[Vol. 34
2003] Discovery Sanctions Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) 631
invoked only for cases in which the misconduct demonstrates a
"deliberate, contumacious, or unwarranted disregard of the court's
authority" and such disregard is likely to continue. 113
Two Illinois Supreme Court cases provide guidance with respect to
the type of misconduct that warrants litigation-ending sanctions. In
Sander v. Dow Chemical Co., the plaintiffs filed a complaint on
February 27, 1990, in the Circuit Court of Cook County against twenty-
six chemical manufacturing companies and the Des Plaines Park
District.1 14 One plaintiff alleged that, while employed with the Park
District as a pesticide applicator, he was injured as a result of his
exposure to pesticides, while the other plaintiffs alleged injury as a
result of contamination through direct contact with him.115 During the
last five months of litigation, the plaintiffs' attorney violated four
separate court orders setting the deadlines for the filing of their
complaint.11 6 Further, the plaintiffs' attorney failed to reply to one of
defendant's motions for a protective order and "continued to replead
matters in the amended complaints that had been previously stricken by
court order."' 117
On December 5, 1991, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint
with prejudice. 118 The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to vacate a
prior dismissal order, noting that they had had ample time to amend
their complaint yet failed to do so. 119 The plaintiffs appealed. 120 The
appellate court reversed, finding, inter alia, that Rule 219(c) empowers
the trial courts to dismiss a complaint with prejudice in only very
limited circumstances, which were not present in that case. 121  The
appellate court then remanded the case for further proceedings. 122
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed
the trial court, finding, inter alia, that dismissal of the plaintiffs'
Gannotti, 763 N.E.2d 820, 826 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2002) (describing the trial court's bar of
witness testimony as drastic when the offending party's conduct did not support such a sanction).
113. Sander v. Dow Chem. Co., 651 N.E.2d 1071, 1081 (Ill. 1995).
114. Id. at 1073.
115. Id. Sander also alleged that his wife and two minor children were exposed to the
pesticides as a result of their contact with his body, breath, clothing, and automobile. Id.
116. Id. at 1081.
117. Id. at 1081-82.
118. Id. at 1076-77.
119. Id. at 1077.
120. Id.
121. Id. (concluding that, because the trial court did not find a violation of a discovery order
or pretrial order, it lacked the authority under Rule 219(c) to dismiss a valid complaint with
prejudice).
122. Id.
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complaint by the trial court was not an abuse of discretion. 123 The court
noted that "the trial judge must weigh the competing interests of the
parties' rights to maintain a lawsuit against the necessity to accomplish
the objectives of discovery and promote the unimpeded flow of
litigation." 124 As part of this balancing process, the trial court must
consider the importance of maintaining the integrity of the court
system. 125 When it becomes clear that a party has willfully disregarded
the court's authority and that such disregard is likely to continue, the
interests of the offending party must bow to the interests of its opposing
party. 126
In Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., plaintiffs Mildred and
Almarvin Shimanovsky were involved in an automobile accident in
which Ms. Shimanovsky suffered severe injuries. 127 Soon after the
accident, the plaintiffs' counsel retained a mechanical engineer to
investigate whether the automobile had a defect that may have caused
the crash. 128 The engineer recommended that the plaintiffs' counsel
retain a metallurgist to determine whether grooves found on the power-
steering mechanism indicated a possible defect or whether they were a
result of the crash.1 29  Consequently, the plaintiffs' counsel hired a
metallurgist who concluded that the grooves did not result from the
crash but rather from long-term wear. 130 Based on the metallurgist's
findings, the mechanical engineer concluded that wear and deterioration
in the power-steering mechanism caused the automobile's power
steering to fail. 131
The plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that the accident occurred
because the power-steering mechanism in their automobile was
defective. 132  During discovery, the plaintiffs' engineering expert
123. Id. at 1082-83.
124. Id. at 1081.
125. Id. (quoting People v. Gholson, 106 N.E.2d 333, 337 (111. 1952) (finding that courts must
have the "power to... determine if contumacious acts.., have been perpetrated against" them to
adequately "protect and preserve" judicial authority)).
126. Id.
127. Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 287 (I1. 1998).
128. Id.
129. Id. The engineer conducted an initial investigation, which did not reveal the presence of
any defect that would have resulted in a loss of power-steering control. Id. The engineer then
disassembled the power-steering mechanism to conduct an internal inspection, which indicated
that various components were damaged by the accident. Id. The engineer also found grooves in
one of the power-steering components. Id.
130. Id. The metallurgist sectioned the components of the mechanism and tested the sectioned
pieces. Id.
131. Id. at287-88.
132. Id. at 288.
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produced the power-steering components to defense counsel. 133 The
defendant's experts examined the power-steering components and
opined that the plaintiffs' automobile contained no defect or
unreasonably dangerous condition that caused or contributed to the
crash. 134  In addition, the defendant's experts concluded that the
sectioning of the power-steering components by the plaintiffs' experts
deprived defendant of the opportunity to show the jury further evidence
of the proper manufacture and operation of the mechanism. 135
On the eve of trial, the "plaintiffs filed a motion in limine, seeking to
bar the defendant from cross-examining the plaintiffs' experts regarding
their methods of testing the power-steering components."' 136 Defendant
responded with its own motion to dismiss the case or, in the alternative,
to bar any evidence of the condition of the power-steering mechanism,
as a Rule 219(c) sanction, for the destruction of the power-steering
components by the plaintiffs' expert witness without notice to the
defendant. 137  Following a hearing, the trial court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint with
prejudice. 138
The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
defendant had not shown that it suffered prejudice to a degree that
mandated dismissal of the complaint. 139 The trial court denied the
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, and they appealed. 140  The
appellate court found that the destructive testing of the power-steering
components was sanctionable conduct on the part of the plaintiffs. 14 1
The appellate court, however, reversed the trial court's dismissal order
and remanded the case to determine whether the degree of prejudice
suffered by the defendant warranted dismissal of the plaintiffs' cause of
action. 142  The appellate court found that the trial court abused its
discretion by dismissing the plaintiffs' case without first considering the
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. The plaintiffs' motion included an affidavit from an additional mechanical engineer
retained by the plaintiffs' counsel. Id. In the affidavit, the second engineer opined that the tests
would not have yielded data relevant to the alleged defects of the power-steering mechanism. Id.
Further, the second engineer noted that the destructive testing of the power-steering components
had not hindered his ability to form his opinions. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Id.
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degree of prejudice suffered by the defendant. 143 The plaintiffs filed a
petition for leave to appeal, which the Illinois Supreme Court
granted. 144
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment
but ordered the trial court to enter an order other than dismissal. 145 In
so holding, the court first addressed the issue of whether the trial court
had authority under Rule 219(c) to impose a sanction on the plaintiffs
for destructive testing of evidence before commencement of the
lawsuit. 146 The court noted that the plaintiffs' experts tested the power-
steering components approximately eight months prior to the date that
the plaintiffs filed their complaint and that, therefore, the trial court had
not entered any order prohibiting such testing. 1
47
Nevertheless, the court held that a potential litigant owes a duty to
take reasonable measures to preserve the integrity of relevant and
material evidence. 148  Without such a duty, the court reasoned, a
potential litigant could circumvent discovery rules or escape liability
simply by destroying the proof before filing the complaint. 149 The court
concluded that the plaintiffs' destructive testing interfered with the
defendant's discovery rights. 150 Thus, under the specific circumstances
of this case, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that the
plaintiffs' actions constituted unreasonable noncompliance with
discovery rules. 151
The court then addressed the question of whether dismissal was the
appropriate sanction. It noted that an order of dismissal with prejudice
is a drastic sanction to be invoked only for cases in which the party's
actions "show a deliberate, contumacious, or unwarranted disregard of
the court's authority."'1 52 The court further stated that dismissal should
be employed only as a last resort and only after all of the court's other
enforcement powers have failed to advance the litigation.
153
143. id.
144. Id. at 287.
145. Id. at 293.
146. Id. at 289.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 290.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. (stating that the court could not find that the trial court had abused its discretion in
determining that the plaintiffs' actions unreasonably interfered with discovery).
152. Id. at 291.
153. Id.
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Applying the six-part sanction test, 154 the court found that a majority
of the factors considered in determining which sanction to impose
weighed in favor of the plaintiffs. 155 The court went on to note that the
act of destroying or altering evidence, while prejudicial, does not
automatically mandate that a cause of action should be dismissed with
prejudice. 156 Rather, a court must consider the unique factual situation
that each case presents and then apply the appropriate criteria to those
facts in order to determine which particular sanction, if any, should be
imposed. 157 To do otherwise, according to the court, would serve to
punish the party and fail to further the objectives of discovery. 158
Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing
to determine the degree of prejudice that the defendant suffered as a
result of the plaintiffs' alteration of evidence. 159  The court also
instructed the trial court that, once it had ascertained the level of
prejudice suffered by the defendant, it should have then determined
what sanction, if any, was warranted. 160
The court, however, went on to explain that, regardless of the trial
court's findings, the defendant was not prejudiced to the degree that
dismissal with prejudice was the appropriate sanction. 16 1 First, the
plaintiffs' testing only altered or partially destroyed the automobile
components and was done in a good faith effort to better determine the
legitimacy of their legal claims. 162 Second, the "plaintiffs' actions were
not a knowing and willful defiance of the discovery rules or the trial
court's authority."' 163 As a result, the court found that the dismissal of
the plaintiffs' case was an unreasonable sanction. 164 According to the
court, a reasonable sanction would have been one other than dismissal
or one that did not totally prevent plaintiffs from presenting evidence
regarding the condition of the power-steering mechanism. 165
Thus, under the principles articulated in Sander and Shimanovsky,
only a very narrow class of cases warrants litigation-ending sanctions.
154. See supra Part IV.C (discussing factors that courts consider in determining whether to
impose discovery sanctions).
155. Shimanovsky, 692 N.E.2d at 291.
156. Id. at 293.
157. Id. at 293-94.
158. Id. at 293.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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First, a trial court should conduct a hearing, applying the appropriate
criteria. 166 Such a hearing permits the court the opportunity to assess
the unique factual situation that is presented. Second, if after such a
hearing, the court determines that the party's misconduct rises to the
level of willful defiance of the court's authority and other less onerous
enforcement options have not been effective, a trial court may exercise
its discretion and impose drastic sanctions.
VI. A PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE: PUNISHMENT
FOR SEVERE DISCOVERY MISCONDUCT
When a court imposes litigation-ending sanctions, it is difficult to
discern how any meaningful distinction exists between Rule 137 and
Rule 219(c), despite their conflicting purposes. In effect, the court does
punish the dilatory party by dismissing his or her lawsuit. The rationale
for dismissal under Rule 219(c) may be couched in terms of balance, 167
but the practical effect is the same. Perhaps the more intellectually
accurate approach would be for courts to recognize that when they order
drastic sanctions, they are engaging in punishment. This shift in judicial
focus properly highlights the extreme nature of discovery misconduct.
Because of the penal emphasis of Rule 137, sanctions under the rule
are regarded as more severe than those under its counterpart, Rule
219(c). 168 Thus, for extreme misconduct, Rule 219(c) should adopt the
rationale of Rule 137 in explicitly endorsing punishment as its stated
purpose.169 Employing this approach would send an important message
to would-be violators of Rule 219(c) that if they engage in willful
discovery misconduct, courts would not hesitate to deal harshly with
them, both in name and in deed.
166. See supra Part IV.C (discussing factors a court should look at in determining what type
of sanction to apply to an offending party).
167. Bachman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 776 N.E.2d 262, 290 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2002) ("In
fashioning a sanction, the court must weigh the competing interests of the offending party's right
to maintain a lawsuit against the need to accomplish the objectives of discovery and promote the
unimpeded flow of litigation.").
168. See Timberlake & Pionk, supra note 1, at 1048 ("Rule 137 [sanctions] should be reserved
for dishonest litigants, lazy or careless attorneys, and the dilettantes of trial practice.").
169. This approach would be consistent with other instances in which the language of Rule
219(c) has paralleled the language of Rule 137. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c), comm. cmt.
(explaining that the 1995 revisions adopted, on two occasions, the language of Rule 137, giving
trial courts greater discretion to fashion an appropriate sanction and requiring a judge who
imposes a sanction to specify his or her reasons for the sanction in the judgment order or in a
separate written order).
[Vol. 34
2003] Discovery Sanctions Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) 637
If Rule 219(c) were transformed into a limited 170 punitive provision,
a second necessary change to the current sanction approach would be to
require that Rule 219(c) provide the same procedural safeguards that are
in place under Rule 137. A detailed sanction petition, an evidentiary
hearing on the merits, and a fee hearing, if appropriate, would provide
due process 17 1 protection for the parties involved. With these
safeguards in place, a person accused of engaging in serious discovery
misconduct would be better positioned to assert a vigorous defense.
As a corollary to these procedural due process protections, adequate
notice must also be provided. 172  There can be no ambiguity or
uncertainty that the standard used to assess serious misconduct is
willfulness, that the penalty the sanctioned party will bear will be the
dismissal of his or her cause of action, and that this dismissal will be
considered a punishment.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to assist judges and attorneys in better
understanding the discovery sanction process. In so doing, this Article
has focused on providing the legal framework with which to analyze
serious discovery abuse, as well as the practical considerations that are
necessary to ensure that the court's order is "just." This Article has also
sought to provide guidance on the question of how courts should
respond to serious discovery misconduct. The authors have proposed
altering the rationale governing Rule 219(c) for cases in which
allegations of serious discovery misconduct have been substantiated.
Under this proposal, Rule 219(c) would adopt punishment as its
stated objective in an effort to properly highlight the extreme nature
of the violation. Finally, the authors have attempted to provide
recommendations for areas in which little or no guidance currently
exists.
Serious discovery misconduct is a topic of vital concern to the
judiciary. The manner in which the court system responds to discovery
abuses will likely have a profound impact on the rights and reputations
170. For discovery misconduct that does not rise to the level of a willful violation of an order
or rule, the non-punitive approach that Rule 219(c) has adopted should continue, balancing
enforcement and resolving cases on their merits. See Blakey v. Gilbane Bldg. Corp., 708 N.E.2d
1187, 1191 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1999).
171. See Potocki, supra note 11, at 996-97 & 996 n. 158 (citing Societe Internationale Pour
Participants Industrielles et Commercials, S.A. v. Roger, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958)) (noting that
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause must be read in conjunction with Rule 219(c)).
172. See id. at 997 ("Adequate notice of the standards to be used by the courts for the
imposition of severe sanctions is essential." Such notice promotes "clarity and consistency.").
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of attorneys and litigants. Because of the judiciary's pivotal role in this
process, it is imperative that courts are well equipped to shoulder this
responsibility.
